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Legal studies react to the Union’s social legitimacy deficit either by 
funneling the problem into empirical sociology (accompanied by the familiar 
call for more transparency and democracy), or by ignoring it altogether. This 
article argues that the crisis in social acceptance can be traced back to the 
texture of EU law. Law is more than a body of rules: It is a social practice, a 
structure of meaning, and a system of beliefs. In this light, national law has a 
richly textured cushion of cultural resources to rely on, which makes it 
“ours”. In contrast, EU law embodies the fluid surface of consumer identity 
and appears less “ours”. The Union’s counter-measures – adding pathos and 
patina to neutralize our distrust – have proven unsuccessful. The way out, 
then, is coming to terms with the market citizen, rather than believing in, and 
forcing upon the consumer, stories of shared values and historically situated 
commonality. 
 
I. Constitutionalism’s Never-Ending Legitimacy Crisis 
European constitutionalism used to be all the rage, but isn’t any longer. 
Scores of articles and books take it for granted. If they bother making 
explicit mention of it at all, it is in the self-assured way of statements such as 
“Constitutionalism is the DOS or Windows of the European Community.”
1 
What’s more important, the European Court of Justice makes no bones about 
its understanding of the Treaties as the Constitution of the Union. As early as 
1964, in Costa v. ENEL, the Court referred to the EEC Treaty as being “in 
contrast with international treaties”.
2 Fifteen years ago in Les Verts, it 
unabashedly called the Treaty “the basic constitutional charter”.
3 In its 
opinion on the Draft agreement on a European Economic Area, the Court 
eventually held that 
                                                           
* Special thanks to Antje Wiener and Colin Harvey. This paper was first presented at the third meeting of 
the UACES Study Group on Constitutionalism and Governance Beyond the State, Belfast, February 2002. 
1 This is the opening line in J.H.H. Weiler’s The Reformation of European Constitutionalism, 35 JCMS 97 
(1997), at 97. 
2 Case 6/64 [1964] ECR 585, 593. 
3 Case 294/83 [1986] ECR 1339, 1365.  
the EEC Treaty, albeit concluded in the form of an 
international agreement, none the less constitutes the 
constitutional charter of a Community based on the rule of law. 
As the Court of Justice has consistently held, the Community 
treaties established a new legal order for the benefit of which 
the states have limited their sovereign rights, in ever wider 
fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member 
States but also their nationals... The essential characteristics of 
the Community legal order which has thus been established are 
in particular its primacy over the law of the Member States and 
the direct effect of a whole series of provisions which are 
applicable to their nationals and to the Member States 
themselves.
4 
The story of the Community’s “constitutionalization” has been told way 
too often to be repeated here. Suffice it to mention the foundational period’s 
doctrines of direct effect, of supremacy, of preemption, and of implied 
powers, the Court’s protection of human rights, and the elaborate 
Community system of judicial review.
5 Thus, the Community legal order has 
evolved from a set of legal arrangements binding upon sovereign states into 
a vertically integrated legal regime conferring judicially enforceable rights 
and obligations on all legal persons and entities, public and private, within 
the sphere of application of EC law. That, exactly, is the definition of what is 
called “constitutionalization”.
6 
The process of constitutionalization has been accompanied by a handful 
of mysteries, none of them very mysterious any more. Why, for example, 
would the Member States agree to, or at least acquiesce in, such a profound 
transformation of the Community system – something that many called a 
judicial rewriting of the Treaties?
7 Why, to give another example, would the 
Member State courts willingly go along and let themselves be persuaded and 
co-opted, despite the radicalism of the ECJ’s doctrinal construct? 
Those riddles have largely been solved, with illuminating accounts and 
insightful explanations provided by a number of studies.
8 While there is little 
reason for complacency, it is now safe to assume the constitutionalization 
thesis will not be brought down by any of those mysteries. It all fits too 
                                                           
4 Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6084, 6102. 
5 The classic account being, of course, J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 
(1991). Reprinted in J.H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE. “DO THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN 
EMPEROR?” AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (Cambridge/Engl.: Cambridge UP 1999), 
10. References point to this latter source. 
6 Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutional Dialogues in the European Community, in: THE EUROPEAN COURTS AND 
NATIONAL COURTS: DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE (Anne-Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet & Joseph 
H. H. Weiler eds.) (Oxford: Hart Publ. 1998), 305, at 306. 
7 Hartley goes so far as to call it a de facto amendment of the Treaties by the Court. T.C. HARTLEY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (Oxford: Hart Publ. 1999), 131. 
8 Weiler, Stone, Slaughter/Mattli, Craig/de Búrca. 
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neatly. The few remaining champions of internationalism – who call into 
question the constitutionalization thesis and argue that EC law is, at the end 
of the day, not all that different from classical international law – meet with 
fierce, persuasive, and indeed cogent, responses from the 
constitutionalization thesis crowd.
9 
So why bother writing, again, about European constitutionalism? Isn’t 
that like writing about judicial review in the U.S., where so much has been 
said and done about the subject that student editors have a hard time keeping 
their eyes open when obliged to read just another manuscript on the matter? 
Unlike the tired old judicial review debate, however, Europe’s 
constitutionalism debate has, I believe, not even reached the heart of the 
matter. Part of it may be the confusion about what “constitutionalism” 
means. Take Professor Craig’s essay on European constitutionalism in a 
recent issue of the European Law Journal, which suggests no less than five 
different meanings of “constitutionalism” and “constitutionalization”.
10 To 
be sure, it is important to be clear about one’s object of inquiry. But there is 
no need to stress that point since it is virtually impossible to find a statement 
on European constitutionalism without an elaborate definition of the term. It 
is, on the contrary, the excessive backing of normative assertions with 
burdensome abstract constitutional theory that sometimes makes you long 
for minimalism in the Sunsteinian sense: shallow incompletely theorized 
agreements which stay away from ambitious reasoning on the foundations of 
philosophical questions operating at a high level of abstraction.
11 
In notable contrast to this weighty foundationalist baggage, the 
burgeoning literature often seems to beg the hard questions. Why is it that 
the Union citizens are all but completely uninterested in “their” Union? How 
come that, according to the Commission itself, “many Europeans feel 
alienated from the Union’s work”? Why is it that there is a “widening gulf 
between the EU and the people it serves”? Why do citizens “no longer trust 
the complex system to deliver what they want”?
12 Craig reminds us that we 
must construct an appropriate normative foundation for the European legal 
order. Such an undertaking is, however, all too often bracketed in 
contributions to EU constitutional theory, mostly under the flag “Space 
precludes discussion of this issue.”
13 The reason may be that legitimacy and 
illegitimacy are notoriously elusive concepts, sometimes dismissed as 
                                                           
9 See poor Trevor Hartley being nicely, but firmly demolished by Paul Craig, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, 
and the European Union, 7 EUR. L.J. 125 (2001), at 130-4. 
10 Craig (supra note 9), at 127-8. 
11 C ASS  R. SUNSTEIN, ONE  CASE AT A TIME. JUDICIAL  MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME  COURT 
(Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard UP 1999), 11-14; Cass R. Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 
(1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (New York/Oxford: Oxford UP 1996). 
12 Commission, European Governance – A White Paper, COM(2001) 428 final, OJ 2001/C 287/01, at 5. 
13 Craig (supra note 9), at 134 note 52. 
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suggestive, even speculative, rather than analytically rigorous.
14 Many 
commentators have reacted by cutting the conceptual cake of legitimacy in a 
number of directions. One can, for example, distinguish between the social, 
normative, performance, regime, and polity dimensions of legitimacy.
15 
Whether or not there is broad social acceptance of the system would be a 
question of social legitimacy then. That is a matter, it may seem, best left to 
empirical studies (like the one recently conducted by OPTEM for the 
European Commission
16) and their interpretation by trained empirical 
sociologists.
17 Although we lawyers worry about things like social rejection 
– Germany’s lawyers had to learn the hard way in the Weimar Republic – 
we certainly don’t feel competent to make inquiries into peoples’ beliefs and 
their consequences. What we’re good at is formal, or legal, legitimacy. 
Formal legitimacy implies that all requirements of the law are observed in 
the creation of the institution of system. It is something akin to formal 
validity.
18 That is, presumably, why the literature is overflowing with 
accounts of legal doubts about juridical constructs and democratic 
deficiencies, while the subject of social legitimacy leaves legal 
commentators mostly stunned and analytically silent. Usually, we voice our 
worries about social skepticism, thus making our bows in passing to 
empirical sociology and the cheeky but often penetrating and insightful 
feuilletons, and then hurry to funnel the debate into channels closer to home. 
I will argue that such treatment of one of the core problems of European 
integration is inadequate. Social skepticism is, in fact, not the exclusive 
domain of empirical sociology. Rather, it is closely and, indeed, inseparably 
linked with the domain of law. Social legitimacy, then, is a matter of legal 
consideration, and deserves attention from the perspective of the law. 
The law, as I shall argue, is not just a body of rules. It is a social practice, 
a way of being in the world. A social practice is not merely a set of 
prescribed actions, but rather a way of understanding self and others, and 
thus, a way to make actions meaningful. To live under the rule of law is to 
maintain a set of beliefs about the self and community, time and space, 
authority and representation. Law’s rule is a system of beliefs – a structure 
of meaning within which we experience public order as the rule of law. Of 
course, there are other structures of meaning. Everything that can happen is 
within the imaginative reach of the rule of law. Yet, all that happens is 
                                                           
14 J.H.H. Weiler, The European Court of Justice: Beyond ‘Beyond Doctrine’ or the Legitimacy Crisis of European 
Constitutionalism, in: THE EUROPEAN COURTS AND NATIONAL COURTS (supra note 6), 365, at 372-6. 
15 Neil Walker, The White Paper in Constitutional Context, JEAN  MONNET  WORKING  PAPER  10/01, 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/011001.html. 
16 OPTEM S.A.R.L., Perceptions of the European Union. A Qualitative Study of the Public’s Attitudes 
to and Expectations of the European Union in the 15 Member States and in 9 Candidate Countries, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/governance/areas/studies/optem-report_en.pdf. 
17 Such as, amongst many, PUBLIC  OPINION AND INTERNATIONALIZED  GOVERNANCE (Oskar 
Niedermayer & Richard Sinnott eds.) (Oxford: Oxford UP 1995). 
18 WEILER (supra note 5), at 80. 
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simultaneously imaginable in ways other than law. Most importantly, there 
are two alternative competing forms of meaning: political action and love. 
Their grammar is in many ways opposed to that of the rule of law, and each 
strives to suppress, or at least co-opt, the other. A cultural study of the rule 
of law must examine those alternative systems of meaning, just as law itself 
must recognize political action or love.
19 
Many things follow from such a cultural study of the law. The most 
important one in the present context, however, is that polity, constitution, 
and law are inextricably bound together. Let us take the state as an example. 
The state maintains itself through the ‘invention’ of a collective self that is 
the people. The people appears as both the sovereign and the product of the 
constitution. However, the project of state maintenance can succeed only 
because the state locates itself within an historical project that is both the 
source and the product of the state. Political communities construct the past 
of which they conceive themselves to be the product. The same is true of the 
territory of the state. In other words, the state invests, and maintains, 
meaning in a bounded space. Law, which is the source and the product of 
such imagination of political existence, and which serves as memory and 
storage of such political meaning, needs to be rooted in bounded principles, 
too. It carries forward constitutive meaning only if it goes beyond the 
rational, the efficient, or the just. That, however, is not the case in the 
European Union. If citizens don’t give a hoot for the Union, that is because 
EU law isn’t ‘theirs’. EU law fails in its attempt to create and maintain a 
collective identity. It does not carry forward rooted meaning. I will, in a 
moment, try and explain why. What is obvious even now, though, is that the 
Union isn’t more complicated or more opaque than any state government. It 
is not a lack of transparency, even though that would allow us lawyers to 
delve into more deliberations about what we can do best, like set up new 
org-charts, or propose, again, to place the whole decision-making process on 
the internet. Rather, the reason for the curious and specifically European 
dilemma is that the Union texts are merely texts, and nothing more. They are 
not ‘our’ texts. They lack deep social meaning. In the EU, meaning must be 
constructed and maintained in different ways, namely by ceaseless political 
action. The myth of never-ending progression in the Union is a veil that 
hides the double failure of Union law. That failure consists of its inability to 
store meaning; also, it is impossible to retrieve meaning by reading and 
interpreting the Union’s law. EU constitutionalism fails in the same way, for 
the same reasons. Whether or not a Convent, after due deliberation, writes up 
a text and calls it a “Constitution”, makes little difference to what has just 
been said. That “constitution” would also be nothing but a text. Just as the 
                                                           
19 This cultural approach to symbolic meaning goes back to Ernst Cassirer and Michel Foucault and has 
been developed most forcefully by PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW. MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA (New Haven/London: Yale UP 1997); PAUL  W. KAHN, THE  CULTURAL 
STUDY OF LAW. RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (Chicago/London: Chicago UP 1999); PAUL W. 
KAHN, LAW AND LOVE. THE TRIALS OF KING LEAR (New Haven/London: Yale UP 2000). 
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ink on the Treaty of Nice has not dried yet, and already we turn away and 
talk about the post-Nice process, we would not wait for the ink on that 
“constitutional” document to dry before we would think about the next, and 
the next, and the next thing to do. 
I will first explain the relation between law, constitution, and social 
meaning (II.). Law is a way of perceiving the meaning of political events, 
but it is just one way. The political imagination is contested domain. To see 
an event as an instance of law’s rule is to suppress alternative perceptions of 
the same event. One of those alternatives is political action. It is “law’s 
other” and deploys a very different grammar. The conflict between law and 
political action (especially political action’s apotheosis, revolution) is a 
conflict between past and future, tradition and possibility. It reaches its 
deepest expression in the tension between loyalty and responsibility. To 
understand the rule of law, we must look to the experience of the political as 
it makes conflicting claims of loyalty and responsibility. Most obviously, the 
tension arises at law’s origin. The transition from revolution to law is the 
problem of creating a political order in which self-consciously novel action 
is displaced by legal permanence. That transition requires the production of a 
text – not just any text, but a text that bears the meaning of law’s source. As 
it turns out, sacrifice becomes the crucial paradigm in this context. Sacrifice 
is the inscription on the body of an ideal meaning. More generally, sacrifice 
is the process by which ideas are embodied in historical artifacts. Law, then, 
begins with the act of reading the scarred body. Interpretation is the reverse 
process of inscription of meaning: it realizes the ideal content of the artifact. 
This is an old religious theme which links the meaning of the political under 
the rule of law to the meaning of the political in love’s imagination. Law, if 
it is to carry forward meaning, cannot be explained by reason alone. It is 
here where liberalism fails. 
I will then proceed to explain that EU law does not fulfill the criteria set 
out above (III.). The Union, born from the ashes of Auschwitz, millions dead 
and indescribable destruction, was the reaction to the destructive force of 
politics’ eroticism. It is the spirit of reason that the Community rose from. 
The founders considered themselves to be men of the Enlightenment, and the 
task of creating an integrated Europe appeared to them to be a problem of 
applied political science. What informed the Community project 
(symbolized, mostly, in the Commission) was, and still is, the spirit of 
engineering. There is a total absence of sacrifice at the heart of the 
imagination of the political in Europe. Even if the founding ideas ever were 
backed by sacrifice, that never translated into the law. Therefore, while there 
is law (and the law, of course, is being followed), the law fails in carrying 
forward deep social meaning. 
There has been no transition from political action to law, from future to 
past, from possibility to tradition, and from responsibility to loyalty. There 
couldn’t be, in the face of the lack of storage for sacrifice. That explains 
Europe’s breathlessness today, as well as the stunning lack of social 
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legitimacy. As a consequence, we should stay away from the idea to write a 
“Constitution” for the Union. 
However, that is not the end of the story. I am not trying to declare the 
end of the history of European integration (that would be laughable), nor 
have I much sympathy for theories prophesizing the decline of the West. I 
believe there is much promise where few people have been looking for it. 
Europe’s potential lies precisely in its superficiality, in its privileging of the 
commercial, in its shallowness and emptiness. Many mourn this. Weiler, for 
instance, complains about European “bread and circus democracy” and a 
“Saatchi & Saatchi Europe”.
20 However, there is strong evidence that today, 
“we can learn more about the operations and values of social communication 
from Saatchi & Saatchi than from Holmes and Brandeis.“
21 I will therefore 
argue that the Union should forsake all striving for the nation-state’s folklore 
and instead embrace the central ideology of “mainstream culture”, which 
seems to be liberal consumerism (IV.). The hub of postmodern life strategy 
is not making identity stand, but the avoidance of being fixed and thus the 
fear of foreclosure of options.
22 Doing just that by doing without a 
“constitution” would finally bring Europe closer to its citizens. 
 
II. The Meaning of a Constitution
23 
The rule of law is a shorthand expression for the imaginative construction 
of a complete social-political order. It is a way of perceiving events and 
actors, and a framework of understanding that makes it possible to perceive 
legal meaning in every event. It provides a temporal and geographical shape 
to events, a normative grounds for claims of authority, and an understanding 
of the self and others as subjects with rights and responsibilities.
24 
The rule of law, then, is a social practice, a way of being in the world. To 
live under the rule of law is to maintain a set of beliefs about the self and 
community, and to understand actions of others and of the self as 
expressions of these beliefs. Functional analysis cannot grasp the meaning of 
law. It is the imagination that constructs the past and the future of the polity, 
just as it constructs, at the same time, the political identity of the citizen. In 
the political imagination of citizens of Germany, for instance, the rule of law 
echoes with the memory of World War II and Auschwitz; American citizens’ 
political imagination of the rule of law echoes with the memory of 
revolution and civil war, with a continuity between the citizens and the 
                                                           
20 J.H.H. Weiler, Bread and Circus: The State of the European Union, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 223 (1998). 
21 R ONALD  K.L. COLLINS  & DAVID  M. SKOVER, THE  DEATH OF DISCOURSE (Boulder, Colo.: 
Westview Press 1996), at 70. 
22 Zygmunt Bauman, Tourists and Vagabonds: The Heroes and Victims of Postmodernity, in: ZYGMUNT 
BAUMAN, POSTMODERNITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS (New York: NYU Press 1997), at 89. 
23 In exploring the meaning of law and constitutions, I closely follow the arguments advanced by Paul 
Kahn (supra note 19). 
24 KAHN, LAW AND LOVE (supra note 19), at 171. 
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Founders, etc. In other words, the rule of law is a structure of beliefs about 
the meaning of the polity. Its value lies not in objective facts but in the 
deployment of power to sustain these beliefs. What we must investigate, 
then, is the structure of meaning within our experience of public order as the 
rule of law occurs. 
Perhaps, language is a useful analogy. Our ordinary understanding of the 
self is inseparable from our use of language. We belong to our language far 
more than it belongs to us, and through language we find ourselves 
participating in this particular history and society. What it means to be a 
subject is determined by a social phenomenon (language) that is itself 
contingent upon subjects who are shaped by it. Similarly, we are potential 
citizens of the state before we are anything else. We are not first individual 
subjects who then choose to join the polity. From the beginning, our 
imagination is shaped by a particular political and legal universe that claims 
us before we can claim otherwise.
25 
 
Political Action as Law’s Other 
The rule of law operates within the contested domain of the political 
imagination. It is one effort to structure political perception. Law, however, 
does not exhaust our perception of the political. There are conflicting 
appearances of political meaning. Like language, the rule of law is based 
upon a particular grammar. The alternative appearances of the political 
domain deploy different political grammars. Most importantly, there is 
political action – and revolution, being political action’s apotheosis – which 
provides a very different structure for imagining the domain of the political. 
I will try and demonstrate the differences in the respective grammars of law 
on the one hand, and political action on the other, with regard to two issues 
only: time, and the individual. 
Law’s temporal structure is the construction of the future through the 
maintenance of past meanings. The rule of law contemplates only its own 
continuation. Therefore, we associate stability and predictability with it. Our 
belief in the rule of law rests upon the assumption that the future of the 
political order should be the same as its past. Law links the future to the past 
by continuing its permanence. When law comes into play, political meaning 
is already established, and law maintains it. Only the extraordinary can 
disturb law’s rule which, essentially, is a maintenance project. Such 
extraordinary events may come from the outside in the form of invasion, or 
from inside the polity in the form of revolution. 
Political events, however, can also be appreciated for the novelty they 
introduce. Political actors promise novelty and changes that will improve the 
political order. Such future-orientation becomes most evident in revolutions. 
Law and political action operate in diametrical temporal structure. The 
revolutionary project terminates the old and remakes the future. Political 
                                                           
25 KAHN, REIGN OF LAW (supra note 19), at 35. 
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action, in revolutionary moments, takes on a character completely a-
historical. 
The rule of law is not the rule of men. It cannot be an expression of the 
will of some particular group or class (even if that group or class uses the 
law to pursue its ends). To explain a legal rule as a self-interested exercise of 
power by a group of individuals is to criticize the legitimacy of its claim to 
be law at all. Law’s rule must appear to be the rule of no particular 
individual: the rule of law is the rule of no one. The independence of law 
from any particular subject accounts for many of the virtues associated with 
it, such as equality, impartiality, and universality. Law uses a variety of 
strategies to suppress the appearance of the individual subject – in Germany, 
for example, it is impossible, both for academics and judges, to use the first 
person singular. 
In contrast, under the imagination of political action, politics is seen as a 
field for personal distinction, for great deeds and great words by the 
individual subject. The political actor seeks to perpetuate her memory by 
creating a singular appearance of the self. The goal of political action is not 
to maintain an already established legal order but the achievement of 
personal fame that can give shape to the future. Politics is subject-driven: the 
politician promises to be unique and will introduce new structures, 
programs, and ideas into the political order. Law appears merely as a side-
constraint, while the meaning of politics lies in the distinction of the self 
from others. 
 
Loyalty vs. Responsibility 
The conflict between law and political action (revolution) reaches its 
deepest expression in their opposing attitudes toward time. The 
revolutionary looks to the future, and sees the present as a means to a new or 
remade future. The past is valuable only insofar as it teaches something 
about the task of political reconstruction. The rule of law, on the other hand, 
looks to the past as the origin of the political meaning of the community. It 
sees the future as the space for the continuation of an already established 
order. The conflict between these two imaginations is mirrored by the 
distinctive moral stances that each perspective supports. 
The rule of law claims loyalty as its source of moral support. Loyalty 
arises within particular, historically given situations. There can be no loyalty 
in the abstract. Nor is there a universal loyalty to all humankind. Loyalty 
attaches to the relationships within which I already find myself, not to those 
I might enter. Loyalty does not arise out of my plans for the future but from 
the past I already have, regardless of whether I was responsible for its 
creation. Obligations of loyalty can be created or deepened by consent, but 
they are not the same as obligations that arise from contract or promise. One 
can make promises to strangers, and break them without necessarily 
violating an obligation of loyalty (e.g., if one is willing to make up the 
damages). 
  9 
Revolution, on the other hand, finds support in the morality of 
responsibility. Responsibility is the moral stance that takes its fundamental 
orientation from the capacity to act and bring something new into being. It 
looks at the possible rather than the actual, and therefore moves toward a 
universal perspective. Revolution rejects the automatic privileging of the 
historical particular that characterizes loyalty. Rather, it is revolution’s first 
task to precisely overcome the moral claims of loyalty. The rewriting of 
history, which now becomes a narrative of coercion by those who rule, 
undermines the pull of the past, and of loyalty. Breaking with the past opens 
a future constrained only by responsibility. 
 
 
The Transition from Revolution to Law 
Based on these insights, it becomes possible to identify the “meaning” (in 
Ernst Cassirer’s sense) of law, and constitutions. While the imaginations of 
law and revolution compete, they do not succeed in suppressing each other 
as a whole. Sometimes they have to co-opt each other – most evidently at the 
point of law’s origin. The problem of law’s origin is to create a political 
order in which novel action is replaced by legal permanence. For revolution 
to give way to the rule of law, the political order must change its appearance. 
The virtue of loyalty must displace that of responsibility, a transition which 
is never easy. 
To endure, a revolution requires a transition from the epiphanic moment 
to a stable order. Long after they have been experienced, revolutions must be 
read. Permanence requires establishing a historical memory. 
Of course, there has to be a connection between the original event and the 
process of reading it. Germans remember and read the Hambacher Fest, not 
the American or French Revolution.
26 It is not the abstract quality of an idea 
that infuses historical memory, but its quality as “ours”. Memory and 
remembrance is not the same as studying political science. 
The transition from revolution to law requires the production of a text for 
future generations. “The first generation writes the book of state; later 
generations read it,” writes Paul Kahn.
27 The text of the revolution is, for 
instance, the bodies of the revolutionaries themselves. Revolutions are, first 
of all, ideas. The abstract idea, however, becomes the foundation of a new 
political order only when individuals are willing to engage in acts of 
sacrifice and invest their bodies in that new set of ideas. Conversely, when 
citizens are no longer willing to sacrifice themselves to the existing order, it 
becomes an empty shell without the power to make a claim upon the citizen. 
 
                                                           
26 See the pathbreaking work of PIERRE NORA, LIEUX DE MÉMOIRE, 4 Vols., Paris 1984-92; for an 
imitating German project see ETIENNE  FRANÇOIS  & HAGEN  SCHULZE  (EDS.), DEUTSCHE 
ERINNERUNGSORTE, 3 Vols., München: C.H. Beck 2001. 
27 KAHN, REIGN OF LAW (supra note 19), at 85. 
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The Role of Sacrifice 
The connection between the original event and the process of reading it is 
the sacrifice. A revolution belongs to a people because they carry forward its 
meaning in the sacrifices they have been willing to make. Sacrifice is the 
inscription on the body of ideal meaning. The scarred body is a visible 
symbol of the political meaning for which the individual is willing to give 
herself. Law, then, begins with the reading of the marked body. Sacrifice 
makes the body a text, a bearer of an authenticated testimony. If we are 
unwilling to make any sacrifice, we may not be anyone at all. We have no 
character, only desires. The desiring body is not read, it is satisfied. It leaves 
no trace; its very existence is a matter of indifference to others. 
The body turns us from a focus on an indefinitely open future to the past 
we already have. It reminds us that we enter the political domain with a 
limited set of resources. 
It is only a short step from reading the body to reading the constitution as 
the revolutionary text. The body is not infinite, but a rare resource. The finite 
and soon-to-disappear body-text needs to replaced by a text potentially 
infinite. The body lends the authenticity of its sacrifice to the text that is the 
product of revolution. In other words, the product of the spent body is the 
legal text. The sacrificed body establishes this text as ours. 
The course of reasoning from revolution to law necessarily moves 
through the body, and from body to text. An idea becomes a legal text only 
through an act of sacrifice. Otherwise, it would be of no political 
significance. Law, then, is the text read out of past acts of political sacrifice. 
Sacrifice and interpretation are therefore linked. Sacrifice is the process by 
which ideas are embodied in historical artifacts – interpretation is the reverse 
process, by which the ideal content of the historical artifact is realized. It is 
loyalty that links interpretation to sacrifice: It directs interpretation to a 
particular sacrificial act that contains our meaning. 
 
The Failure of Liberalism 
No theory of contractual origins of law (whether or not behind a veil of 
ignorance) is capable of explaining why a particular system of law is 
uniquely ours. Efforts to explain or derive law’s rule from the perspective of 
reason alone inevitably ignore the geographic and temporal boundaries that 
are at the core of our experience of the state. 
Liberalism is speechless in the face of sacrifice. Liberalism sees justice at 
the heart of the modern political project; justice is the ambition of the 
constitutional project upon which every modern state is founded. Justice 
appears as the realization of reason in the legally protected relationships of 
individuals to each other and of each to the state. Hobbes set the pace: 
Justice expresses a kind of pure practical reason. Famously, this is the 
deployment of reason behind the “veil of ignorance”. Reason promises the 
specification of just principles that are timeless and universal. Justice is blind 
because it measures conflicting claims against a universal metric of reason 
and ignores the identity or character of the person who makes the claims. 
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Behind the veil of ignorance, there can be no pathologies (like uncontrolled 
individual desire or the communal pathology of the unreason of religion). 
The rule of law, however, is different. Reason, and justice, are, of course, 
part of it. But it has also moved from contract to sacrifice. It is a 
maintenance project, writing forth the meaning of sacrifice as origin. Social 
contract theory cannot incorporate this. The liberal divide between public 
and private suppresses the erotic character of the political. This comes as no 
surprise because it has been a project of Enlightenment to understand politics 
as the product of reasoned discourse. An adequate conception of the political 
cannot start, or end, with justice. It is elementary for a political community 
to expect sacrifices from its members; in the state, this can be a question of 
life and death. The state conceives of itself as ultimate meaning and strives 
to perpetuate its own historical meaning over time. The state loves only 
itself. Political theory must be capable of explaining the conditions under 
which citizens are ready to bear the sacrifices expected from them. Justice, 
as explanation, is insufficient. 
 
III. The Failure of European Constitutionalism 
The meaning of law in the European Union is very different from the 
meaning I have just laid out. Union law lacks the erotic component so 
distinctive of the domain of the political in nation-states. It epitomizes the 
liberal project of a rational rule of law rather than that irrational, bounded, 
rooted project that is the nation-state rule of law. I will attempt to show that 
the differences in the conception of rule of law have decisive consequences 
for the Union’s finality and future gestalt. 
 
The Union’s Birth From Rationality 
No one will want to maintain that Europe was born from belief, visionary 
revolution, shared sacrifices, emotions, or love. If there is one project of 
political order that was born from the spirit of rationality and enlightenment, 
that would be the Union. How could it be otherwise? To be sure, there is a 
lot of talk to be heard about the Schuman Declaration’s pathos; there is also 
recurring talk of Churchill’s Zurich speech on September 19, 1946, calling 
for a “United States of Europe”.
28 However, Churchill had been removed 
from office at the time. What’s more, it seems the Zurich speech was just 
another example of that typically British motto, “Don’t do what I do, do 
what I tell you to do.”
29 It was Churchill himself who, a few years earlier, 
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had maintained that “We are with Europe, but not of it.”
30 Europe was a 
macabre unity, coming together in infinite destruction, with camps of POWs 
and millions dead, as an expanse of rubble. Auschwitz was the absolute zero, 
and the hatred was great enough to spawn serious suggestions to “strew 
Germany with salt”. To build Europe upon emotional appeals to feelings of 
sharedness and community would necessarily have had to fail. Still, there 
were two imminent problems to solve: first, what to do with Germany, 
second, how to rebuild Europe?
31 The Schuman plan was the well-planned 
and deliberate response to these questions. One should not be deceived by its 
pathos: note that it speaks of “de facto solidarity” only. The lack of grand 
vision, and the tangible pragmatism of the Declaration has been noted too 
often to be repeated here. What is important, though, is the fact that 
European integration was conceived as a contract and as a project guided by 
enlightened rationality. We see this in many details. Take the original gestalt 
the Union. There is no doubt that the Union, irrespective of its subsequent 
constitutionalization, was constructed through classic international law 
treaties. International law, with few exceptions, is basically law through 
consent between states. Governments represent states, and international law 
is the product of governmental actors striving for coordination of their 
mutual interests. International law, in other words, is the apotheosis of the 
social contract: it is predicated on the analogy between the sovereign state 
and the unified self. Purvis points out that liberalism in international law, as 
elsewhere, can be understood as a philosophy that combines an atomistic 
psychological assumption with a radical epistemology about morality. The 
liberal psychological understanding is sovereign-centered, with world order 
representing nothing more than a social contract among sovereigns. The 
epistemological assumption is the principle of subjective value, leading to 
the claim that decisions about morality can only be made by the international 
order’s atomic components, its sovereigns.
32 There is no need to explain at 
length the lack of sacrifice and the erotic in international law. We can, again 
and again, study the unerotic consequences of liberalism and universality by 
looking to nation-states’ unwillingness to invest bodies, money, or meaning 
into NATO or UN projects. 
 
Europe as Style, Expertise, and Project 
It stands to reason that Europe’s cultural artifacts and symbols, too, 
received their share of such enlightened liberal ethos. The world of Brussels’ 
office towers was designed to embody the technical coolness and the 
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modernization of the old continent. It was a world of xeroxed working 
documents and greyish-greenish office furniture, of simultaneous translators 
in soundproof cabins featuring multi-channel cables, of license plates in 
blue-white-red and recently founded European schools which taught more 
than three foreign languages and transnational history. This sat well with the 
then zeitgeist of sky-scrapers, autobahns and nuclear power plants: where 
such controlled technique was to rule, national idiosyncrasies and 
peculiarities became mere folklore and, thus, superfluous. Europe was in the 
hands of technocrats.
33 
The international element of the Union (e.g., the European Council and 
the Council of Ministers) is closely associated with contractarianism and 
liberalism. Both are political theories which are speechless in the face of 
sacrifice. A similar charge may be levelled at the Commission whose mode 
of governance is hostile to the idea of sacrifice, too. The Commission pools 
expert knowledge and seems like governance through management and 
technocracy epitomized. There is a diffusion of accountability through the 
rise of comitology. Expert management, however, may produce an efficient 
and perhaps even satisfactory distribution of society’s resources, but it 
cannot produce the historical-communal understanding of self-identity that 
characterizes the rule of law as an experience of political order. To the 
expert, it doesn’t matter how the present state of affairs came about. Loyalty 
may appear irrational. Management, as a form of science, knows no borders. 
One may say that the truth of law lies always beyond the law itself. Law is 
silenced by claims of expert knowledge that purport to provide their own 
grounds of authority. Scientific expertise always speaks for itself. It relies on 
no authority apart from itself, whereas law, on the other side, never speaks in 
its own voice. Like every scientific voice, management exists in the present. 
It tests the past and future against present interests. Law tests the present 
against the past, while action tests the present against the future. 
Management is in history but is not itself historical.
34 
Another facet of Europe as a project of modernity becomes visible in the 
oft-used metaphor of Europe as a project. This is one of the central motifs of 
modernity. “In modernity, Man’s finitude becomes reconciled with the 
infinite and eternal, in terms of progression... [as] an interim apotheosis, one 
which rejects the preceding being but which also contains that being and 
prefigures all the object is yet to become.“
35 European academic literature 
will not tire in emphasizing the project nature of integration, and the 
procedural nature of Union law. The Treaty of Rome, is what we read, did 
not lay down a static legal order which was complete from the beginning. 
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Rather, European integration is said to be a legislative process characterizing 
the Union as a legal system evolving over time. The Court, too, cashes in on 
the myth of progression by privileging the teleological method of 
interpretation.
36 Progression, it seems, becomes an essential element in the 
mythical structure of the Community legal order. The Union cannot compete 
with the law of nation-states as a source of order or transcendent being in 
terms of what it is. It can only attempt to do so in terms of what it is not, and 
in terms of what it well be.
37 
There is hardly anything new in noting that the Union is of little use as a 
projection surface for emotional identification. Jacques Delors, as President 
of the European Commission, remarked that “you don’t fall in love with an 
internal market without borders”. Basically, the whole debate about 
democracy and legitimacy is about little else. This is particularly true since 
Community competencies have extended into fields that used to be exclusive 
domains of the nation-state. Political science has described the outcome as a 
situation of “dual sovereignty”
38 and demanded that a European identity 
legitimize the exercise of European governance. However, there is little 
merit in such statements. The real question is what makes integration 
possible, and here we are faced with a dazzling variety of possible solutions. 
The proposals include everything from shared values and ends (such as 
welfare statism)
39 to the recognition of difference as unifying paradigm.
40 It 
is true, debates about the conditions of integration are in abundance, the 
reason being the development of modernity under the sign of postmodernity. 
The Union, however, witnesses a debate that is fiercer than others, possibly 
because the foundations of its legitimacy are in question. The reason is 
precisely this: The Union legal order, as a rational legal order, is unable to 
use the same resources as the nation-state. I believe that this is a theme to be 
found in all of integration theory literature, be it political science, law, 
sociology, or cultural theory. My own view is that it is possible to 
understand almost all flash-in-the-pans – nation and nationalism, state and 
statism, Volk and ethnos, identity and constitution – through this lens. 
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Europe as Imagined Community 
The Union, of course, has not turned a blind eye on this dilemma. The 
Commission, above all, has commissioned countless studies, initiated 
working groups, and written up White Papers in order to test social 
acceptance of the Union, to define problem areas, and to work out solutions. 
In addition, the Commission, long before 1993, embarked upon various 
initiatives in the fields of media and information policy to promote 
integration in the sphere of culture by enhancing what it saw as “the 
European identity”. These initiatives are not without a certain comic effect – 
I will return to this in a moment –, which is why scholars tend to 
underestimate the Commission’s prowess. The Union’s demiurges know 
their political theory. They have read Hobsbawm and have learned that 
history is central to the imagining of community, for how people experience 
the past is intrinsic to their perception of the present. History, they know, is 
also fundamental to their conception of themselves as subjects and members 
of a collectivity. Following Hobsbawm and Ranger
41, they have focused on 
the “invention of European traditions” and on practices which seek to 
inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by implying continuity with 
the past. The past, like social memory, is a construction, actively invented 
and reinvented. The Commission might also have learned from Benedict 
Anderson’s highly influential “Imagined Communities”. Anderson defines 
nations as “imagined political communities” because its members will never 
know, meet or even hear of most of their fellow-members, yet in the minds 
of each lives the image of their communion. His theoretical point of 
departure is, indeed, mass-sacrifice for the nation and, ultimately, death. 
Death brings the threat of oblivion. In a secular age we increasingly look to 
posterity to keep our memory alive, and the collective memory and solidarity 
of the nation helps us to overcome the threat of oblivion. Nations are 
characterized by symbols of commemoration, notably the Tombs of 
Unknown Soldiers, which suggests that nationalism, like religion, takes 
death and suffering seriously (in a way that Marxism and liberalism do not). 
It does so by “transforming fatality into continuity”, by linking the dead to 
the yet unborn. The nation, according to Anderson, is particularly suited to 
this “secular transformation of fatality into continuity, contingency into 
meaning”, since nations “always loom out of an immemorial past, and, still 
more important, glide into a limitless future. It is the magic of nationalism to 
turn chance into destiny.”
42 This is just what the Commission had in mind: 
transforming contingency into meaning. However – unfortunately, if you 
want –, the Commission had no fatalities at its disposal it could turn into 
continuity. Perhaps, here is the reason why its initiatives all too often appear 
both helpless and comical. 
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For the Commission, the first significant step towards defining a cultural 
basis for European unification came in 1973 with the signing of the 
“Declaration on the European Identity”. The then nine Member States 
declared, inter alia, that they shared “the same attitudes to life, based on a 
determination to build a society which measures up to the needs of the 
individual”; that they each wished to ensure that the “cherished values of 
their legal, political and moral order are respected”; and that they were 
determined to defend “respect for human rights”, “the principles of 
representative democracy, the rule of law” and “social justice” (the “ultimate 
goal of economic progress”). The 1974 summit recommended measures for 
protecting rights of Europeans and a specific policy for forging a “People’s 
Europe” through “concrete manifestations of the European solidarity in 
everyday life”. The Commission got a green light to pursue cultural 
initiatives “in order to affirm the awareness of a common cultural heritage as 
an element in the European identity”. The emphasis of consciousness-raising 
as a strategy for bringing Europe “closer to its citizens” and creating 
“Europeans” thus signalled, writes Shore
43, a new departure in EU 
approaches to the neglected domain of culture. This departure received 
another boost by the disappointingly low turnout in the 1984 European 
Parliament elections. The European Council agreed to establish an ad hoc 
Committee for a People’s Europe whose task was to suggest measures to 
“strengthen and promote the Community’s identity and its image both for its 
citizens and for the rest of the world. The Committee was headed by Pietro 
Adonnino and produced a number of reports the following year. These 
reports stressed that it is “through actions in the areas of culture and 
communication, which are essential to European identity and the 
Community’s image in the minds of people, that support for the 
advancement of Europe can and must be sought”. They identified several 
areas to possess popular appeal as sites for promoting the “European idea”. 
These included a Europe-wide audio-visual area with a truly European 
multilingual TV channel (“in order to bring the peoples of Europe closer 
together”), a European Academy of Science (“to highlight the achievements 
of European science and the originality of European civilization in all its 
wealth and diversity”), and a Euro-lottery with its prize-money awarded in 
ECU (“to make Europe come alive for the Europeans”). The reports called 
for the formation of European sports teams, the inauguration of school 
exchange programs and voluntary work camps for young people, and the 
introduction of a stronger European dimension in education. All of these 
measures were designed to enhance European consciousness and 
Europeanize the cultural sector. 
This approach to Europe is still very much in fashion, as the White Paper 
on “European Governance” and the attendant Working Group reports 
demonstrate. Working Group 1a dealt with “Broadening and Enriching the 
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Public Debate on European Matters”. It found its purpose “in the sobering 
and well-documented reality that, despite all of the efforts made by Europe’s 
institutions over the last decade, very few convincing answers have yet been 
found to the cry: ‘how can we take Europe closer to its citizens?’”.
44 While 
the Union’s competences and responsibilities very closely resemble those of 
most nation-states, its institutions do not have a relationship with the general 
public “that remotely compares with that of national institutions”.
45 Public 
support, therefore, is far from overwhelming. Knowledge of European 
affairs is low; prevailing attitudes to the Union are characterized by either 
indifference or lack of knowledge or a combination of both.
46 The Working 
Group maps the way forward by pointing out that decision-makers need the 
support of an informed European public and the creation of a “collective 
intelligence” on European issues. Then you’ll find the heading 
“Enlightenment could lead to more popular support”.
47 In practical terms, the 
Group suggests partnership networks of journalists, teachers, professors, 
associations, etc., to foster dialogue “close to the ground” and “establish 
links between EU institutions and civil society”. One of the most important 




Most importantly, the Union has recognized the overwhelming 
importance of symbols. Being not a “natural” but an “imagined” community, 
it needs to be constructed through complicated ideological, political and 
cultural mechanisms and procedures. Such construction and re-construction 
takes place discursively. The re-construction of community as European 
Union touches upon the self-understanding and the practices of its members, 
their bodies, and their construction of the “Other”. Discursive constructions 
build on communication in order to develop, and generalize, an image of 
oneself. They make use, not only of narratives, but of images, media, and 
cultural artifacts of all kinds. “Imagined communities” have to do with 
“imago”, too. Objects become images of meaning.
49 
It is here that EU iconography comes to the fore. The Adonnino 
Committee recommended various “symbolic measures” for enhancing the 
Community’s profile. Foremost among these was the creation of a new EC 
emblem and flag. That flag was taken from the logo of the Council of 
Europe. It boasts twelve golden stars which form a circle against a blue 
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background, and professes to be a symbol of everything that is said to make 
Europeans European: from the Occidental via the Religious to the Esoteric. 
The number of starts is fixed, twelve being (as the Council of Europe has it) 
a symbol of perfection and plenitude, associated equally with the apostles, 
the sons of Jacob, the tables of the Roman legislator, the labors of Hercules, 
the hours of the day, the months of the year, or the signs of the Zodiac. 
Twelve is also a representation of the Virgin Mary’s halo of stars in the 
Revelation (from which, according to some interpretation, the new Messiah 
will be born). Thus, it seemed the symbol par excellence of European 
identity and European unification, a rallying point for all citizens of the EU. 
There are countless other symbolic vehicles for communicating the 
“European idea”. Take, above all, the European anthem, which is the over-
played “Ode to Joy” from Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, and which is 
available as high-quality recording or, perhaps for the busy, compressed 
recording on the Union’s web site.
50 Take the thousands of Jean Monnet 
Awards, the European Woman of the Year Awards, the variety of European 
Year of the Whathaveyou (Conema, Culture, the Environment), or the 
officially designated Europe Day (it’s May 9
th, commemorating the 
Schuman Declaration in 1950). Take the European Literature Prizes, the 
standardized European passport, the European license plates, the stamps 
bearing portraits of EC pioneers, or the European city of culture initiatives. 
The political aims behind these initiatives were, of course, ambitious, trying 
nothing less than to reconfigure the symbolic ordering of time, space, 
information, education, and the media, to reflect the “European dimension”. 
In the end, it seems, all these initiatives failed miserably.
51 What’s more, 
they are not without a certain comic effect. It was Kierkegaard who said, 
“Just as much pathos, just as much comic effect. They secure each other.” At 
this point, we are in the midst of a discussion of aesthetics. What, after all, is 
pathos? Pathos suggests stylishly domesticated passion. That is mistaken 
though. The new and distinctly European problem of pathos is not life’s 
eventful turbulence, but rather the paralysis of all expression in a hieratic 
world of gestures. Formulas of pathos are designed to formally inject new 
tension into a frozen, rigid world and make it move again.
52 Pathos is thus a 
final escape from problems of meaning – and that is the context to discuss 
the European pathos not just of anthems and flags, but of the Constitution-
To-Be and the Charter of Fundamental Rights as well. 
To speak of pathos is to speak of the aesthetic. It is impossible, through 
purely functional description and analysis, to capture the gestalt  of the 
Union. Description and analysis today will have to move to, or at least 
include, the level of the aesthetic. The much despised and oft-scolded world 
of consumerism has taken this to heart long ago. Legal analysis has not. The 
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student of the European Union and its law will, at first glance, discover a 
huge variety of approaches and schools. On closer inspection, though, she 
will discover a core of sameness. The EU narratives are tried and true and 
reminiscent of a round of old buddies, having conversations, either 
affirmative or critical, which unfailingly sport a core of what you might want 
to call consensus, or at least, affinity. Nevertheless, equally unfailingly, they 
seem to miss the nerve of the Union and its problems. 
Recent studies of consumerism show what I mean. Daniel Harris, for one, 
attempts to recover the suppressed aesthetic data of our lives and to make the 
vast archive of subliminal images accessible to conscious analysis. He feels 
it necessary to describe consumerism on the level on which the consumer 
actually experiences it: on the visceral level of the senses, the bodies, “from 
the point of view of the hand reaching for the soup can on the store shelf, the 
ears listening to the boom box broadcasting the sounds of a cool, refreshing 
soft drink splashing into a frosted glass, and the eyes fixed on the screen of 
the multiplex as the Titanic sinks”.
53 
The Union, too, must be subject of aesthetic discourse. It is a bit 
surprising that it practically isn’t because for decades now, the Commission 
has been talking about “A Citizens’ Europe”. The citizen perspective should 
be important then, and it would be enormously helpful to examine the Union 
on the visceral level on which the Union citizen actually experiences it. 
Much less surprising than the lack of aesthetic discourse would be the 
analytical result, which is nothing less than disastrous. The Commission 
continually bemoans the fact that Europeans feel alienated from the Union, 
that they have disappointed expectations, that there is a widening gulf 
between the Union and the people it serves – and wonders why.
54 The 
answer is right there, in its face, on its own web site. Look up the things I 
have pointed out above (flag, anthem, prizes), and you will have an intuitive 
understanding of the citizens’ complete indifference towards “their” Union. 
 
A Cultural-Legal Study of the Union’s Problem 
The European Union’s problem of meaning is, of course, the problem 
that its citizens are completely indifferent towards it. The Union produces 
texts which nobody reads and nobody knows. Nobody is interested. That has 
fatal consequences. Texts, legal texts above all, are a polity’s memory, if you 
want the hard disk storing authentic witness. As I have shown (II.), in 
nation-states, some legal texts – constitutions – embody ideal historical 
meaning which links the present to the past, to some point of origin, like a 
revolution and the consecutive writing of the constitution. Such texts 
constitute states as “imagined communities” and continue them over time. 
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They can claim loyalty as their source of moral support because they are 
“ours”. 
Union texts are not “ours”. They are just texts, empty shells with no 
roots. Rather than an embodied set of meanings they are seen as a set of 
ideas without the power to make a claim upon the citizen. They do not bear 
deep social meaning. There is no myth of origin; there are no bodies willing 
to be invested into ideas, no traces, no sacrifices. There is nothing that could 
convey authenticity on EU texts. Ultimate meaning disappears behind the 
semantics of rationality. Because of the lack of sacrificial meaning, Europe, 
in contrast to all its rhetoric, is not a new beginning really, since what is 
missing is the founding, creative power. The political future will look like 
the political past: belief in novelty, which is behind sacrifice, is non-existent. 
In the Union, then, there is nothing to remember, and hence nothing to 
maintain. Union texts do not constitute a collective self; rather, they 
constitute a Common Market. Markets cannot tell us who we are: they 
operate through desires, which are mere placeholders. We have no character, 
only desires. The desiring body is not read, it is satisfied. It makes no public 
appearance to others and leaves no trace. Its very existence is a matter of 
indifference to others.
55 Money, the universal means of exchange on the 
market, is the perfect example. There is nothing with less memory than 
money. There’s an old saying that says you shouldn’t conduct money 
business with friends or foes. The perfect business partner is thus someone 
completely indifferent, gauged neither for nor against us.
56 The category of 
price, it seems, makes history and individuality disappear. Remarkably, it is 
precisely at the point of this total indifference where the European rationality 
of the market and the European social contract – concluded by 
unencumbered selves behind the veil of ignorance – converge. 
No history, no identity, no individuality – that’s not how you produce and 
maintain social and political meaning. We do not reach ourselves through 
markets and reason alone. We cannot reason about, or trade in, the symbolic 
dimension of meaning. Whereas money and reason create borderless fluidity, 
political and social meaning needs to be rooted. The Union’s legal texts are 
lacking in the way they look to the past, and they are unable to stabilize 
anything deeper than the ever-changing fluid surface of trade, travel, and 
consumption. That is the reason why the EU, in the eye of the beholder, 
appears so breathless. As there is no memory to store meaning, meaning 
needs to be generated through political action, again and again and again. 
Meaning, in the Union, exists only within transitory and forgetful moments. 
It is a-historical and respects neither borders nor authenticity. Without 
reservoirs of meaning, there can be no room or time to have a breather, read 
the legal texts and realize their ideal content. There can be no stable 
meaning; there can be only frantic, restless and ceaseless production of ever-
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new meaning. Europe, in this sense, is truly revolutionary, because political 
action may never come to an end. In the conflict between loyalty and 
responsibility, the latter prevails. Responsibility, however, is the mode not of 
law, but of political action. Citizens, therefore, see Europe as politicians 
negotiating and re-negotiating. Politicians speak the discourse of 
responsibility; the future is a horizon of possibilities. Europe is the never-
ending project. History is being rewritten and re-rewritten. It is in the nature 
of revolutions to break with the past – and here is the reason why all 
references to occidental culture, Christendom and Latin (or French) as the 
once  lingua franca seem so unpersuasive. Revelation, which shares a 
temporal structure with revolution, constructs meaning not from history, but 
from truth which manifests itself in and through action. That is why we are 
hardly able to read through the Treaty of Nice before, with its ink not dried 
yet, we hear talk of the post-Nice process and plans for the next 
Intergovernmental Conference. 
 
Europe and Consumer Aesthetics 
The Union, in its attempt to be close to its citizens not only recognizes 
this deficit, but has initiated counter-measures. These counter-measures can 
best be understood, I believe, from the perspective of consumer aesthetics. 
There is no substance in them, they are an effort in aesthetics. What lies 
behind them is a principle of consumerism. 
One of the most important functions of the aesthetics of consumerism, 
writes Harris, is to provide us with an emotional cushion, a form of 
camouflage, a credible disguise for a culture that refuses to admit the truth 
about itself. We don’t like to see ourselves as consumers, or our culture as 
that of consumerism. We continue to pretend that our values are those of an 
intimate world full of Mom-and-Pop businesses, rather than an 
overpopulated megalopolis dominated by multinational cartels. The 
aesthetics of consumerism helps us keep that faith by hiding consumerism 
from consumers. They combat our estrangement from a world packaged in 
plastic by restoring the “aura” of the handmade to our commodities. They 
also shore up our sense of selfhood and individuality, which have been 
deeply compromised by the conditions of urban society. The aesthetics of 
consumerism have incorporated our distrust into their marketing techniques. 
They have built into consumerism symbolic forms of resistance to it: 
ineffectual strategies of rebellion that make consumers believe they are 
loners or oddballs, immune to advertising strategies rather than at the mercy 
of Madison Avenue.
57 The perfect disguise for conformity has become 
rebelliousness. You buy shoes, for example, which remind you of running 
shoes, and feel like a rebel battling the conformist obligation to wear 
conservative shoes with dark laces to work. You’re being in control, capable 
of action and rebellion, rather than being controlled: you “dare to ‘be 
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different’”. In fact, all you actually do is wear fashionable shoes, just like 
everybody else. 
It is possible to identify a number of broad principles that govern the 
appearance of popular culture, among them cuteness, zaniness, coolness, and 
idyllic quaintness. Quaintness responds to the discontent of a culture trapped 
in an eternal present. It disfigures things to eradicate the stigma of their 
newness, their disturbingly characterless perfection which smacks of the 
alienating anonymity of assembly lines. Quaintness also compensates for the 
absence of real personal history. We hide our sense of uprootedness by 
creating a sepia-tinted simulacrum of history and “instant” traditions. Even, 
and especially, those who are cut off from history, like we often are, feel the 
need to establish something like continuity with the past. The result is 
quaintness riding roughshod over authenticity. It often mourns the loss of 
cohesion in family life and of the intimate circle brought together around the 
fireplace by darkness and cold weather. Quaintness is the industry’s tool to 
help reduce our deep-seated distrust of advertising and our fear of shoddy 
goods. It rectifies problems that consumerism itself creates, and allows us to 
express our discontent with consumer culture and society. 
Quaintness is also what the Union is after. As a vehicle, it has chosen a 
number of romantic idyllic items; one of them is the Constitution-To-Be; 
another is the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights as Consumer Aesthetics 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, solemnly proclaimed during the 
IGC in Nice on December 7, 2000,
 58 serves the same purposes as quaintness 
in consumer aesthetics. Both, the appearance of popular culture in the form 
of quaintness and the Charter, are meant to offer us symbolic ways of 
expressing discontent, and to neutralize our feelings of inferiority, caused by 
our status as objects, not subjects, of globalization and international trade. 
The Charter has no other use than that associated with consumer 
aesthetics. In the face of the laughter and merriment surrounding the Charter 
it is important to point out that the European Court of Justice has developed, 
for more than three decades now, a rich and differentiated human rights case 
law. Since 1969, at least, the Court has been ready to invalidate Community 
legislation that violates EC fundamental rights. Does the newly proclaimed 
Charter offer better protection of fundamental rights? The Charter itself says 
no. In its Chapter VII, it admits that neither the scope of the rights it 
guarantees is broader, nor the level of protection is higher, than the case law 
status quo. 
Clarity is another common justification for the Charter. However, like all 
human rights documents, the Charter is drafted in magisterial, sometimes 
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cloudy language. While there is much to say in favor of such constitutional 
traditions, clarity is not one of its features.
59 
Is it, then, at least a symbol of shared European identity? Hardly. While it 
was solemnly proclaimed, it has no binding legal force. Some regard this as 
a symbol, not of shared identity, but of European impotence and of refusal to 
take rights seriously.
60 Even if it is bound to become law some day, doubts 
remain about its integrative force. Europe already has a pronounced culture 
of rights, with a tightly knit web of fundamental rights protecting its citizens: 
bills of rights in Länder  and federal constitutions, the EJC rights 
jurisprudence, the ECHR and its human rights court in Strasbourg, and the 
two 1969 UN Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights. Waving yet another catalogue of rights in a 
culture of rights saturation will not make the citizen any closer to the 
Union.
61 It is an additional delightful detail that the community of Europeans 
is expected to assemble under the umbrella of a Charter that will grant them 
legal protection against legislative acts from Brussels – a European 
community against the European Community. 
Why, then, is it that so much money, and so many resources, are lavished 
on the Charter if there is so little to say for it, either legally or symbolically? 
The answer is, it’s aesthetic. The Union wants the Charter to de-stigmatize 
itself and to neutralize our distrust. The vehicle is quaintness. The Charter 
compensates for the lack of real European history. Notwithstanding all 
rhetoric the Union is a young entity with no model or predecessor. Europe 
has, not one story, but a multitude of stories which are contradictory, 
competing, and violent, and which need to be reconciled with each other. 
Europeans think of “their” Union as faceless Brussels bureaucrats, smooth, 
modern, insipid, and completely characterless. The Union suffers from its 
unrooted newness. Its insatiable surge forward cuts it off from the past. That 
provokes its citizens’ distrust, and they refuse it their loyalty. The Union is 
seen as the epitome of bureaucratization and centralization. It rationalizes 
life (through international division of labor) and depersonalizes the market 
(through internationalization). It emphasizes competition and transborder 
trade of goods through the Common Market, thus appearing as 
commodification of values personified. In addition, there is the peculiarly 
modern angst because truths and certainties crumble, identities become 
fragmented and transitory, feelings of displacement and uprootedness grow, 
and all that is solid melts into air. The Union ideally attends to such 
anxieties.
62 
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The Charter of Fundamental Rights is the Union’s designers’ program to 
steer in the opposite direction. The Charter’s solemn declaration evokes the 
spirit of the Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776 and of the Déclaration des droits 
de l’homme et du citoyen of 1789. In part, this is deliberately done in order 
to create the impression that the Union’s roots reach back to the origins of 
modern democracies. Perhaps, what is hoped for is not merely a solution to 
the problem of lacking history and character, but to that of democratic 
legitimacy as well. By proclaiming a catalogue of rights, the Union adorns 
itself with the embellishments of the fountains of democracy – among them, 
the principle of popular sovereignty.
63 
At the same time, in reaching back to 1776 and 1789, the Union creates 
patina for itself. Patina is a physical property of material culture which 
consists in the small signs of age that accumulate on the surface of objects. 
The surface of objects, originally in pristine condition, takes on a surface of 
its own, being dented, chipped, oxidized, and worn away. This physical 
property is treated as symbolic property: it encodes a status message and is 
exploited to social purpose. That purpose is the legitimation, authentication, 
and verification of status claims.
64 Just as newly acquired wealth, in a world 
of traditional hierarchy, was under pressure to provide visual evidence of the 
authenticity of its status claim, the Union is trying to secure and verify its 
status in a world of nation-states. The Union is the nouveau riche in Europe 
and needs to prove its wealth is not fraudulent. The gatekeeper that controls 
status mobility is patina. The Charter, of course, is meant to be the chipping 
and oxidization on the EU’s pristine surface. 
The Charter also conjures up an atmosphere of solidarity, brotherly love, 
and transgenerational community (the political theory equivalent of the 
intimate circle gathering around a fireplace). The Preamble, for instance, 
provides that “[e]njoyment of these rights entails responsibilities and duties 
with regard to other persons, to the human community and to future 
generations.” The Charter’s individual chapters have the following headings: 
I – Dignity; II – Freedoms; III – Equality; IV – Solidarity; V – Citizens’ 
Rights; VI – Justice. Here is a world resurrected before our eyes that has 
never known the critique of rights developed by legal realism, CLS, 
communitarianism, feminism, and postmodernism. The Charter appears as a 
means to develop a moral and ethical foundation for the Union. It draws on 
the twin sources of the Ideal and the Other. On the one hand, it refers us to 
the informing ideal of an ethos of collective societal responsibility for the 
welfare of the individual and of the community as a whole. On the other 
hand, the Charter refers to the Other, that which is excluded but nevertheless 
there, such as stories of injustice and fear, or the barbaric orient. However, 
both references are (aesthetically, at least) unconvincing. They remain 
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wooden and simplistic in a saturated liberal society whose role model is the 
Lebensästhet (life aesthete).
65 One accepts them the same way one accepts a 
shoe manufacturer’s claim that its shoes aren’t shoes but the result of a 
dream. 
The creation of the Charter also speaks for my thesis that it is designed to 
create an atmosphere of quaintness. The European Council, meeting in 
Tampere in October 1999, decided to establish an ad hoc body, made up of 
15 representatives of the heads of state and government, the President of the 
European Commission, 16 Members of the European parliament and 30 
national Members of Parliament. On its first meeting, that body called itself 
“Convention” – a name that smacks of Philadelphia and Paris. The German 
version is even more telling than the English one. The body is called 
“Konvent” – a Konvent being “1. a) a community, esp. of nuns, bound by 
vows to a religious life under a superior; b) a gathering of protestant priests 
for further education; 2. a) a weekly gathering of the [active] members of a 
fraternity; b) collectivity of lecturers at a university; 3. (no pl., hist.) the 
convention during the French Revolution.” Atmospherically, this is not 
insignificant. It fits well with the name of the web site that documented the 
drafting process of the Charter: http://db.consilium.eu.int. “ Consilium” is 
Latin, the former European lingua franca, and conjures up the image of a 
Roman council of wise old men, white-bearded and clad in togas. That 
image is linked to progress and modernity surging forward. “Consilium” is 
amended by “eu.int” – a cipher of globalization (“int”) à la Europe (“eu”) –, 
and it appears in the internet, the most progressive medium of 
communication with virtually unlimited possibilities. Such connection of 
Old and New, of tradition and modernity, of local roots and global 
aspirations, also shows in the Convention’s email address: 
fundamental.rights@consilium.eu.int. The old lingua franca appears in the 
same breath, the same address even, as the new lingua franca, the world 
language English. 
Finally, the choice of the Convention’s President fits well into the 
picture, too. Roman Herzog is a former professor of constitutional law and 
Justice and President of Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court – thus 
standing for cool rationality, academic smartness, and legal expertise beyond 
doubt. He is also the former President of the Federal Republic of Germany – 
standing for political vision and statesman-like stature. Most importantly 
though, he was born in a small town in Bavaria (Landshut), was married, and 
has two sons. Despite his steep career, Herzog conveys the impression of 
somehow being native and rooted in the soil, sometimes even of that 
specifically Bavarian snugness. 
All these phenomena serve an aesthetic purpose. That purpose is to 
soothe our deep-seated distrust of the smooth European machinery and its 
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faceless bureaucracy. A “Convention” is neither a machinery nor a 
bureaucracy. Its members have a distinctive personal image. The listen to 
“us” (represented by pressure groups) and take into account our reservations 
and suggestions. Herr Herzog even talks like someone from Landshut: How 
can he not be one of us? The stroke of genius that shows in the idea of a 
Convention is that in spite of all the idyllic coziness, the Union’s twin 
attributes – rationality and expertise – are not weakened. On the contrary, 
they grow stronger because the drafting of the Charter rests with a body of 
experts which bears the name of a gathering of university lecturers, of a 
community of monks or nuns, or of a political body during the French 
Revolution – in Latin still. It must seem to the Union’s architects that such a 
body will be able to scatter peoples’ doubts without giving up the tried and 
true Union standard of administrative expertise. Under such conditions, 
anything becomes possible – even to talk Latin and Bavarian at the same 
time. Things that seemed incompatible become compatible. There is nothing 
that cannot be achieved. Is it any wonder that the Convention method is 
brought up every single time a new text must be drafted and another 
Intergovernmental Conference needs to be prepared? It must seem like the 
golden bullet that is able to blast a hole in the Gordian knot which blocks 
communication between the Union and the citizens that it wants to be close 
to. 
 
The Problem With Consumer Aesthetics 
There is much logical consistency in the Union’s deliberate use of the 
aesthetics of consumerism. Today’s citizens have turned, to a large degree, 
into consumers. Our personal salvation experiences are often founded upon 
consumption. “It is the consumer attitude which makes my life into my 
individual affair; and it is the consumer activity which makes me into the 
individual,” writes Zygmunt Bauman
66, and John Urry maintains that 
“citizenship is more a matter of consumption than of political rights and 
duties.”
67 Saatchi & Saatchi Europe is a reality, and not a bad one at that.
68 
There is no reason, then, why Europe should not print the Charter’s text on 
the wrapping of its product “European Union” in order to sell it. 
The problem is that the Union actually believes that the Charter really is a 
step towards shared European identity.
69 That is as if a shoe manufacturer 
actually believed its shoes weren’t shoes but the result of a dream. It simply 
is wrong to suppose that under the Charter’s influence, the people living in 
Europe will turn into European subjects, coming together in solidarity as a 
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European Community. We have already seen where such belief leads: to the 
comical attempt to make use of nation-state artifacts. Indeed, those artifacts, 
in the nation-state, are able to transport political and social meaning. The 
Union’s texts, like the Charter, however, are not. It is true that subjectivity, 
in the times of globalization, has come under increasing pressure. When 
locality gets devalued, and geographical space is cancelled out, people begin 
to feel like objects of transnational interests. Fundamental rights, however, 
the n
th catalogue at that, are no cure. The cure, as Bauman says, is playing 
the mobility game. Scope and speed of movement make all the difference 
between being in control and being controlled; between shaping the 
conditions of interaction and being shaped by them.
70 It seems that to 
participate in the competition that races along before our eyes is to 
reconstitute subjectivity. Perhaps, the perils of the market are met effectively 
only by the weapons of the market. Besides that, fundamental rights pale 
into near-insignificance and seem like anachronistic window-dressing, at 
least if injected into the rationality of money and the market. 
But let’s be honest. In times in which society itself seems like a fancy-
dress party, with identities designed, tried on, worn for the evening and then 
traded in for the next, we actually like anachronistic window-dressing. 
That’s why we’re delighted about the Charter. “If there is kitsch in our daily 
lives,” writes Daniel Harris, the theorist of consumerism, “it is because there 
is kitsch in our minds.”
71 
 
IV. The Promise of Europe 
A bleak future for Europe, it seems. But is it really? Europe’s failure is 
not all-consuming. It is true, the Union’s finality does not lie in a 
constitution that is able to make use, symbolically and aesthetically, of the 
deep structure of nation-state constitutions. That does not mean, however, 
that Europe is without options and promising finality. The future gestalt of 
the Union is very different from what is commonly assumed, though. While 
the Union cannot rely on imaginations of the political accessible to the 
nation-state, I believe it should consider confining itself to what is possible. 
That, of course, is the imagination of the political as consumption and 
market. In the remainder of this piece I shall argue that embracing liberal 
consumerism is Europe’s unique option, which, in contrast to what cultural 




According to Luhmann, what is modern about modernity is the loss of 
authority. He defines authority as “the ability to represent the world in the 
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world and to convince others of the same representation”.
72 Authority can be 
“founded on knowledge or power or on the knowledge of the future or on the 
ability to create it according to desire, in any case on the future.”
73 More than 
other forms of community, the European Union has a fixation on the future 
because of its imagination mode of political action and its underlying theme 
of responsibility. Loss of authority, therefore, hits the Union harder and 
faster. What seems to have taken the place of authority, says Luhmann, is 
something that may be termed a politics of understanding. Understandings 
“are negotiated positions that can be relied upon for a given time. They do 
not imply consensus, nor do they represent reasonable or even correct 
solutions to problems. They [merely] fix reference points that are removed 
from the argument for further controversies, in which coalitions and 
oppositions can form anew.”
74 
Such diagnosis resonates with similar observations on modern society. In 
particular, the relative confidence about the autonomy of the Subject has 
been shattered. While in the discourses of modernity the Self was constituted 
as an active agent resisting state violence and instituting a project of self-
realization in a process of liberation from constraining structures, we are 
now living in a “de-massified” network of social relations, with threats to the 
autonomy of the individual coming not from the “mass” which annihilates 
the autonomous individual but from the very self-expression of individuality 
itself.
75 The notion of universalizable selfhood which underlay the modern 
project has collapsed in a climate that celebrates difference, the Self as 
context-bound, and multiple identity projects. While modernity derived 
legitimacy from itself and not by reference to transcendental principles, the 
Self has now collapsed into a variety of projects, such as those of creed, race, 
and gender which do not accept any terms of universal reference. 
Post-traditional society, then, is marked by pluralization. In place of a 
secure order of values and social positions there is a bewildering variety and 
fluidity of values, roles, authorities, symbolic resources and social 
encounters out of which an individual’s social identity must be produced and 
maintained. This has been usefully summarized in four themes.
76 Firstly, 
modernity is a post-traditional order in which fixed identities are neither 
ascribed nor unambiguously indicated. Identity, increasingly unanchored in 
tradition, religion etc., can only emerge from choice. Secondly, modernity 
involves a pluralization of lifeworlds in which each individual has to 
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negotiate multiple and contradictory identities as they traverse different 
public and private spheres. Thirdly, modernity replaces traditional authority 
with “methodological doubt” rather than the “certainty of reason”. Truth is 
contextual, authority and expertise are provisional. Finally, modernity places 
mediated experience at the center of social life. Through commerce, the 
mobility of travel, the city and communications, ever more lifeworlds are 
made visible to us and become possible choices of identity. Through 
marketing and commercialization, this plurality of life is directly translated 
into consumer choices. 
There is another theme, commercialization itself.
77 Pluralization is 
intensified by subordinating culture to economic ends. On the one hand, 
consumption is regulated by purchasing power rather than socio-cultural 
rights and priviliges, thus allowing a great fluidity in the use of goods to 
construct identities and lifestyles. On the other hand, cultural values and 
meanings are ever-renewable resources for economic competition. 
 
Consumer Culture 
Consumer culture exemplifies the blurring and flattening of modernist 
distinctions. In the notion of postmodernist culture, commodities have been 
dematerialized and now exist purely as signs circulating within a political 
economy of signs. However seemingly infinite the number of different signs 
in circulation, they are all the same in being just signs. This, then, is the de-
differentiation of postmodern culture: the implosion of sign and reality (or, 
in semiotic terms, of sign and referent, connotation and denotation). The 
plane of signs and culture can no longer be anchored in “finalities” 
(Baudrillard) in the external world. Consumption, for example, is no longer 
anchored in the finality of need, nor knowledge in truth, technocracy in 
progress, history in a meta-narrative of causation and teleology. As a 
consequence, contemporary experience is depthless: there is nothing credible 
beneath or beyond the flat landscape of endless signification. 
The critique, of course, is that of Jameson’s “schizophrenic” subject of 
postmodernity.
78 Consumer culture, in this account, is a fancy-dress party in 
which we dress up our everyday lives in ever-changing costumes, driven by 
impulses which are themselves prompted by the life of the party rather than 
by the life outside it. The schizophrenic subject inhabits a purely present 
tense and is unable to form a coherent ego, and instead swims chaotically 
down a never-ending river of signification. The consumer confronts all of 
social life as a field of simultaneous and flat images from which to choose 
without reference to externalities or anchors. 
That is a scary outlook. It leaves us, like in King Lear, bound to a chaotic 
world as to a “great wheel [that] runs down a hill”.
79 The torments are many, 
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but they all boil down to the sickening feeling of perpetual uncertainty in 
everything regarding the future. The fast and continuously accelerating pace 
of change makes one thing certain, namely that the future will not be like the 
present. The quick succession of futures dissolving into a succession of 
presents also teaches that today’s present – even its domesticated, tamed part 
– does not bind the future. There is little the individual can do to make sure 
that tomorrow’s results will be achieved. If you will, we are fighting a losing 
battle. The above critique, then, rests in a desire of the impossible: On the 
one hand, we want to relish and practice our freedom while, on the other 
hand, we want a happy end guaranteed and the results insured. However, 
there is no risk-free freedom. Communitarianism, for one, has not come to 
terms with this simple fact.
80 
Europe’s discourse includes, indeed, the prospect of consumer identity. 
That is hardly surprising, taking into account the Union’s beginnings as an 
Economic Community. However, consumer identity meets with fierce 
criticism and is played out against “rich” conceptions of citizenship. Bashing 
consumer identity is the ever-reliable starting point for criticizing “market 
citizenship” and “bread-and-circus democracy”. The common denominator 
is that “to define people as consumers and worker-producers is to undervalue 
their worth as individuals and the importance of the political process to good 
government.”
81 Underlying this critique is a powerful and enduring theme
82: 
to understand consumerism as a social pathology that can be played out 
against “culture”. Most authors pursue this theme by trying to show that the 
hedonistic consumer culture is dysfunctional for the individual (it feeds off 
their modern insecurity) but functional for the system (it produces insatiable 
consumers). In this view, modernity dismantles a stable social order and 
reduces the social to the individual, and the transcendental to the calculated, 
rational, and material. The individual’s sources of meaning become blurred 
under such conditions. Consumer culture, then, floods modernity with a 
torrent of values and meanings, both filling in the cultural deficits and 
constantly intensifying and exploiting them. There is an ineradicable 
nostalgia behind such a perspective: consumer culture can never replace the 
world we have lost, provide us with selves we can trust, or offer a culture in 
which we can be truly at home. 
Consumption, however, is a meaningful activity. Humans do not consume 
like animals in that our relation to our needs and our environment is neither 
instinctive and programmed nor confined to the survival of the individual or 
the species. People understand their relation to things in the world in terms 
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of projects and goals, social conventions and norms, concepts of what being 
human involves.
83 Goods are meaningful, and their meanings are part of the 
making of social relations and social order. They are not arbitrary but deeply 
related to the underlying social divisions of a community. Take, for example, 
status symbols. Social stratification is directly mapped onto a division 
between kinds of goods and consumers. What’s more, by using goods in 
accordance with their meanings we experience the social order as a 
compelling moral order and reliably reproduce it in everyday life.
84 
After all, the individual uses consumption to say something about 
himself, his family, and his loyalty. The kinds of statements he or she makes 
reflect only the kind of universe surrounding him or her.
85 Normatively, 
there are theories that take seriously these new, “postmodern” configurations 
without resorting to shallow utilitarianism.
86 The citizen at the center of a 
Europe thus conceived would resist such categories as virtue, republicanism, 
civic-mindedness, just as she resists classifications as Christian, 
commonality of values, shared history etc. Rather, citizens would assemble 
under a superficial neo-Durkheimian integrative umbrella of consumption 
rituals and codes. No doubt, this is more stressful than singing songs 
together around a campfire. But why pretend the world is, or can be remade 
into, a campfire community? Despite the overwhelming lament about the 
decline of culture and values, and the concomitant fragmentation of social 
life and decomposition of community, some strands of sociological literature 
emphasize the communal nature of consumption. According to this view, 
consumption takes on more and more social functions as a form of sociality. 
“Shopping is not just a functional activity,” writes Rob Shields, and 
continues that “consumption has become a communal activity, even a form 
of solidarity.”
87 The resulting groups are marked by their transient 
membership and their refusal of the “grand narratives” of hegemonic 
ideologies. They embrace the local authority of what is close to home, and 
thus are based on local territoriality.
88 That would indeed make them 
affectual cliques which transgress the grid and group divisions of society, 
without neglecting the changeable nature of personal identity.
89 The latest, 
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and perhaps best, example is former New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s 
response to the horrible terrorist attacks on Washington and New York. He 
asked New Yorkers to go back to enjoying their lives and go shopping. A 
serious German newspaper reported this under the heading: “Seid 
solidarisch, geht einkaufen”.
90 
The schizophrenic consumer, from this perspective, is by far not the only 
possible consumer. The postmodern consumer is ironic and knowing, 
reflexive and aware of the game being played. She has considerable cultural 
capital and is able both to make sense of the wealth of mobile and detached 
signs and to treat them as just signs. We might imagine her obtaining 
pleasure not necessarily from the things themselves but from the experience 
of assembling and deconstructing images.
91 
 
The Union and Its Citizen/Consumer 
There are far-reaching conclusions to be drawn in relation to the 
European Union. We have already seen that the image of what is a citizen 
needs to undergo revision.
92 European citizenship cannot be defined through 
essentialist human rights, or exclusive demands on loyalty. It is very much 
the question whether or not it makes sense to craft social rights on to a 
laissez-faire economic framework that is indifferent, perhaps hostile to T.H. 
Marshall’s concept of social citizenship – the more so at a time when the 
welfare state is being dismantled across Europe. There are signs that the two 
domains are increasingly being conflated, with “consumers” and “citizens” 
becoming essentially one and the same thing. The EU booklet “A Citizen’s 
Europe” announces, for instance, “Every citizen a consumer.”
93 Terrence 
Turner argues that the primary basis for political legitimation lies in a 
government’s ability to guarantee “their citizens access to commodity 
consumption on a scale commensurate with their social aspirations. 
Consumption of commodities has thus supplanted the exercise of the 
traditional political functions of citizenship as the main mode of the 
construction – and thus control – of personal identity.”
94 This is particularly 
true of the Euro-polity. Thus, Shore is right in suspecting that “the citizen-
hero of the new Europe appears to be the Euro-consumer.”
95 
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The Euro-consumer can easily do without constitutional pathos. What she 
needs is the possibility of free movement of goods, persons, and capital, 
freedom of establishment and to provide services, and a good measure of 
consumer protection. Europe’s identity is not on the same level as narratives 
of sacrifices, ideal meaning written into bodies and texts, or constitutional 
interpretation as memory. That is the world of the nation-state. The Union 
has no such myth. Those who aim at constructing foundation narratives of 
this kind will be prone to making a laughing stock of themselves rather than 
serving the Union’s purposes. 
The Union could be the first polity that adapts to the new conditions of 
today’s postmodern existence of its citizens. It could renounce stories of 
shared values and historically situated commonality, and could, instead, take 
seriously its citizens’ psychology. In practical terms, this is already the case. 
Just as citizen identity today is fleeting and varied, Union texts are fleeting 
and varied: they are complex, multi-layered, difficult to comprehend, subject 
to constant change, impacted in unpredictable ways by disordered cultural 
spaces and, in a bizarre way, floating. Citizen identity and the Union’s 
gestalt converge in their shallowness. I do not mean this in a pejorative way. 
Shallowness is meant to denote the lack of anchors and roots and to describe 
the restless, adaptable project of a fast-paced, ever-transforming present. For 
both, the EU and its citizens, the hub of postmodern life strategy is not 
making identity stand, but the avoidance of being fixed and thus the fear of 
foreclosure of options.
96 It is impossible to prophesy where such a 
conception of the political might lead. What we do know, though, is that the 
classical path of traditionally organized polities with their nation-state 
imagination of the political is not a viable option for the Union, as the 
helpless Commission initiatives have demonstrated. Europe’s potential lies 
elsewhere, namely in the daring move to do without a constitution and all 
attendant pathos and patina. The Union would overcome the gap between the 
projected nature of the European polity on the one hand, which has 
appropriated cherished symbols of statehood and which lays claim to its 
citizens’ political loyalty, and the nature of the European citizens’ 
experience of citizenship on the other hand, which is dominated by rituals of 
trade, travel and consumption. Perhaps, by giving up its useless and 
implausible “A Citizen’s Europe” discourse, it would gain a more reliable 
foundation for its claim to legitimacy, and be finally as “close to its citizens” 
as it strives to be. 
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